課程大綱

課程資訊

課程名稱

競爭法與智慧財產法專研四

Seminar on Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law (Ⅳ)

開課學期

107-2

授課對象

法律學院法律研究所

授課教師

課號

LAW7424

課程識別碼

A21 M8340

班次

學分

2.0

全/半年

半年

必/選修

選修

上課時間

星期一8,9(15:30~17:20)

上課地點

備註

教室為法研5。
總人數上限：15人

Ceiba 課程網頁

http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1072LAW7424_

課程簡介影片

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課程大綱

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課程概述

美國反托拉斯法之法律執行受到芝加哥學派的影響，一直到最近大多將其執法重心置於水平的聯合行為及結合管制等之規範，對於垂直交易限制行為、包含濫用獨占地位之行為，則多認為該等行為之實施具有合理事由，其規範應適用所謂「合理原則」（Rule of Reason）加以判斷，結果導致濫用獨占地位行為管制數量的銳減。然而，近年來，標準制定組織、標準必要專利、Google、Facebook、Amazon、Apple等資訊服務平台、社群網路等超級規模事業的興起，引起對於資訊獨占等之隱憂，而如何善用獨占地位濫用規範抑制該等事業之市場利用的濫用，再度受到矚目。本課程本學期將針對此一發展趨勢，研讀獨占地位濫用規範之文章，剖析獨占地位濫用規範的過去、現在與未來，期能對數位經濟、AI化社會的發展過程中，競爭法應扮演之角色，有更為深入的理解。

課程目標

本課程將循序漸進由傳統芝加哥學派對於反托拉斯法規範理念及實務運作之批判，呈現出獨占地位濫用規範的管制理念之發展沿革，並藉由最近興起之標準制定、標準必要專利、網路平台經濟、人社群網路、甚至與隱私權保障等之關係，探討獨占地位濫用規範於現今數位經濟、平台經濟、分享經濟、AI經濟等之發展過程中，可能發揮之規範功能，以及不當規範可能帶來之負面影響等課題。促使學生思考，在已經無法避免的人工智慧科技發展對未來社會、經濟生活將帶來重大影響的過程中，在全世界個人資訊已掌握於少數巨大資訊事業的情勢發展下，獨占地位濫用規範對於該種發展過程可以發揮之功能，以及應如何自我抑制、避免過度介入不當阻礙該等發展之可能性及未來性。

課程要求

鑑於本課程並無一本統一的教科書可資參考，且國內可資參考資料幾乎欠缺，因此同學們將藉由外國文獻的閱讀及報告，逐次了解本課程之內容。於外國文獻之閱讀及報告上，將可能產生相當程度的負擔，同學必須確定對於本課程有強烈的興趣及學習欲望，並可配合本課程之進度閱讀相關文獻，方建議選修本課程。

預期每週課後學習時數

Office Hours

每週三 15:00~17:00

指定閱讀

Robert H. Bork, Antitrust Paradox (1978)
Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (2018)

參考書目

Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin, and Ian Kerr (eds), Robot Law (2016).
Ugo Pagallo, The Laws of Robots: Crimes, Contracts, and Torts (2013).

評量方式
(僅供參考)

No.	項目	百分比	說明
1.	期中考	0%
2.	隨堂測驗	0%
3.	作業	30%
4.	報告	70%
5.	期末考	0%

課程進度

週次	日期	單元主題
第1週		課程內容介紹及未來課程實施之具體作法
第2週		獨占地位濫用規範與相對優勢地位濫用之差別、標準必要專利與獨占地位、市場界定之關係等之介紹
第3週		ROBERT H. BORK, LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE POLICY OF THE SHERMAN ACT (1966)；ROBERT H. BORK, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST POLICY （1967）；ROBERT H. LANDE, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged (1982).
第4週		Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Dominant Firm (2010); Herbert Hovenkamp, IS ANTITRUST’S CONSUMER WELFARE PRINCIPLE IMPERILED? (2018)
第5週		Louis Kaplow, ON THE RELEVANCE OF MARKET POWER (2017); Richard Scheelings & Joshua Wright, ‘SUI GENERIS’?: AN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF BUYER POWER IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION (2006).
第6週		DAMIEN GERADIN & J. GREGORY SIDAK, European and American Approaches to Antitrust Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Telecommunications (2003); Francisco Marcos, THE PROHIBITION OF SINGLE-FIRM MARKET ABUSES: U.S. MONOPOLIZATION VERSUS E.U. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
第7週		Damien Geradin, The necessary limits to the control of “excessive” prices by competition authorities – A view from Europe; Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Antitrust Duty to Charge Low Prices (2018)
第8週		Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, INNOVATION AND THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST; Francisco Marcos, INNOVATION BY DOMINANT FIRMS IN THE MARKET: DAMNED IF YOU DON´T… BUT DAMNED IF YOU DO? (2016)
第9週		Hanno F. Kaiser, Are “Closed Systems” an Antitrust Problem? ; Konstantinos Stylianou, Exclusion in Digital Markets (2018).
第10週		Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Unilateral Refusals To Deal, Vertical Integration, And The Essential Facility Doctrine (2008); Damien Geradin, Moving Away from High-Level Theories: A Market-Driven Analysis of FRAND in the Context of Standardization (2014); Renato Nazzini, FRAND-Encumbered Patents, Injunctions and Level Discrimination: What Next in the Interface between IP Rights and Competition Law? (2017);
第11週		David S. Evans, ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS FOR MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS (2013); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses (2012); Damien Geradin, What Should EU Competition Policy do to Address the Concerns Raised by the Digital Platforms’ Market Power? (2018).
第12週		Alden F. Abbott & Joshua D. Wright, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCLUSIVE DEALING (2009); NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES & IOANNIS LIANOS, THE ELUSIVE ANTITRUST STANDARD ON BUNDLING IN EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MICROSOFT CASES (2009); Erik Hovenkamp, TYING, EXCLUSIVITY, AND STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS (2017).
第13週		Silvia Solidoro, Marco Botta & Pier Luigi Parcu, Antitrust Enforcement in Europe after Intel and Cartes Ba caires - A Kind of Trouble to Enjoy (2018); Nicolas Petit, THE JUDGMENT OF THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE IN INTEL AND THE RULE OF REASON IN ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CASES; Damien Geradin, The Opinion of AG Wahl in Intel: Bringing Coherence and Wisdom into the CJEU’s Pricing Abuses Case-Law (2016); Vlatka Butorac Malnar; Ivana Kunda, EU Competition Law in the Digital Era: What to Tell about Intel(2018)
第14週		Bruce H. Kobayashi, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PREDATORY PRICING; GIANLUCA FAELLA & ROBERTO PARDOLESI, SQUEEZING PRICE SQUEEZE UNDER EC ANTITRUST LAW ; J. Gregory Sidak, ABOLISHING THE PRICE SQUEEZE AS ATHEORY OF ANTITRUST LIABILITY
第15週		Ramsi A. Woodcock, PRICE　DISCRIMINATION　AS MONOPOLIZATION(2018); Fernando Diez, Promoting competition in digital markets; a case against the Google case, and the futile search of ‘neutrality’ in on-line searches; Geeta Gouri & Michael A. Salinger, Protecting Competition vs. Protecting Competitors: Assessing the Antitrust Complaints against Google (2016);
第16週		Maurice E. Stucke　&　Allen P. Grunes, Data-opolies （2017）；Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice Stucke, Online Platforms and the EU Digital Single Market Submission to the House of Lords, Internal Market Sub-Committee (2015); Maurice E. Stucke, SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED ABOUT DATAOPOLIES?(2018); Gintarė Surblytė, COMPETITION LAW AT THE CROSSROADS IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: IS IT ALL ABOUT GOOGLE? (2015).
第17週		Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking; Christopher S. Yoo, When Antitrust Met Facebook (2012); Christophe Carug0ati, The 2017 Facebook Saga: A Competition, Consumer and Data Protection Story (2018); Lizeth Carolina & Banda Cartuche, Enforcing data portability in the context of EU competition law and the GDPR (2017).
第18週		期末考週